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Faculty and Deans

Covenant, Justicies Writs, and
Reasonable Showings
by

RoBERT

C.

PALMER*

In 1982, I presented a complex argument interrelating the history
of debt, detinue, covenant, and trespass; it treated the provision of
the justicies writs for county court cases, the development of the
forty shilling rule in county debt/detinue, and the rule requiring
specialty in covenant in the king's court.' The thesis was original
along many lines and has met, expectedly, a certain amount of
scepticism. Paul Brand, in a brief review, only noted that it was
unconvincing. 2 Joseph Biancalana, in both a short review 3 and in a
lengthy review essay, 4 completely dismissed the argument, arguing
at length and in detail a different development, both for the origins of
the justicies writs and for the covenant rule. More recently, David J.
Ibbetson has asserted that the thesis could not bear close examination; he proposed an origin to the covenant rule in Roman law. 5 The
detailed alternatives presented by Biancalana and Ibbetson necessitate a similarly detailed response. Having considered these written
and other informal comments, and with further data, my conclusion
is that the criticisms are unfounded, and not simply a different,
legitimate approach.
The specific legal changes at issue here, together with the wider
implications about the nature of legal development in thirteenthcentury England, likewise justify very careful consideration of the
*Adler fellow, College of William and Mary, Marshall Wythe School of Law.
I. R. C. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval England, 1/50-1350, 174-262
(1982). In preparation of this article I am heavily indebted, as always, to Dr. Paul
Brand, who examined several copies of the tract "Exceptiones contra brevia" in the
British Library for me.
2. Brand, Book Review, 99 Law Q. Rev. 159 (1983).
3. Biancalana, Book Review, I Law & Hist. Rev. 313 (1983) (hereinafter Biancalana, Book Review).
4. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts: A Review Essay (Book Review), 52 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 994 (1983) (hereinafter Biancalana, Medieval County Courts). I find the
critical comments Biancalana makes about the first half of the book to be unfounded,
based on a superficial reading, as are those that concern chapters 7 and 8. That
material, less complicated and more open to historians, can stand more easily on its
own and is outside the scope of the present subject.
5. Ibbetson, Words and Deeds: The Action of Covenant in the Reign of Edward I 4
Law & Hist. Rev. 71 (1986).
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issues. The legal changes not only determined the nature of lesser
jurisdictions in England, but also dictated that covenant would grow
rapidly obsolete, so that the later history of contracts grew rather
out of assumpsit. My analysis suggested that the justicies writs
were provided to route simple cases out of the king's court into the
county courts without litigants thereby losing particularly advantageous royal procedures. Biancalana sees their provision as aimed at
controlling county courts and providing revenue. As will become
apparent, this is in effect an attempt to revive the once useful but
now outdated approach to English legal history associated with
Maitland's work. At all points, the matter deserves attention.
The specialty rule in covenant raises similarly important problems. My explanation was that royal justices became accustomed to
adjudicating covenant actions under justicies writs of covenant removed into the king's court; since those writs always had plaintiffs
with specialty, the justices eventually elevated that happenstance
into an evidentiary rule. Biancalana suggests that the specialty rule
arose simultaneously in county and king's court because of the
growing literacy of society. His alternative avoids facing the problem of why and how the rule appeared; it uses social history to avoid
legal analysis. Ibbetson's alternative, deriving the rule as an outgrowth of a borrowing from Roman law, is far worse, however.
Resorting to Roman law for the source of English common law rules
should be greeted with great scepticism, not because it could not
have happened, but because borrowing from Roman law has so
often served as an easy all-purpose explanation. Once again, it is an
approach that, unless all other avenues are first pursued, discourages close evaluation of the sources. However, any successful
showing of such a relationship between the common law and Roman
law at a point as major as the specialty rule in covenant would be
important; Ibbetson's argument deserves close attention. As I shall
show, the objections and alternatives proposed by Biancalana and
lbbetson are devoid of merit.
Not even the additional evidence I have obtained, however, will
satisfy those who demand massive, direct, and irrefutable proof.
Such clear evidence is unavailable for certain parts of the thesis:
very little documentation has survived for medieval county courts. 6
Nevertheless, there is still so much evidence to support the thesis
that one cannot revert to traditional explanations. This thesis, not
absolutely proved but far stronger than its critics have realized,
should stand until a more explanatory argument replaces it.

6. Palmer, supra note I, at 225-26; Palmer, County Year Book Reports: The Professional Lawyer in the Medieval County Court, 91 Eng. Hist. Rev. 776 (1976).
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I. The lbbetsoii Thesis on the Covenant Rule
David Ibbetson, having rejected the various current theories
about the reason for the requirement of specialty in covenant, posits
a borrowing from Roman law that was then progressively expanded
to cover all cases in covenant. Not only is his criticism of my thesis
unfounded, but his alternative is untenable. Still, his examination of
the problem can lead to an interesting examination of covenant in
the reign of Edward I that would, without explication, otherwise be
lost in the rejection of his article as a whole.
lbbetson adduces two reasons why my thesis about the covenant rule "does not bear close examination." 7 The first is that it is
hard to believe that county courts in mid-thirteenth century England
refused to hear convenant cases not supported by specialty. 8 The
statement is completely true. County courts almost certainly heard
cases of covenant not supported by specialty, both in the midthirteenth century and throughout the fourteenth century. However,
my argument was that there was a distinction between cases brought
by plaint and cases brought by justicies writ. Litigants without specialty would bring covenant cases in county by plaint; purchase of
the justicies writ of covenant presupposed written proof. The specialty rule in county court "relied on a specific writ form" 9 and had
no bearing whatsoever on cases brought by plaint. lbbetson's first
reason for rejecting my thesis is thus based on a misreading.
His second reason is related to the first and is equally unfounded. He considers it implausible that justices "would confuse
the rule applying in the county with the rules to be applied in the
royal courts." 10 The rule, however, was not a county court rule. If
anything, it originated in Chancery, which issued the justicies writs.
The rule attached to the writ, not to the jurisdiction; when such a
writ was removed into Bench, the rule still applied. The effect on the
justices, moreover, is quite believable. Many of the actions of covenant brought by precipe originally into the king's court were nonlitigious: they began the process by which the parties recorded land
settlements in final concords. 11 Justicies writs removed into the
7. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 80.
8. /d.
9. Palmer, supra note I, at 209.
10. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 80.
II. To make a final concord, one could bring either a writ of warranty of charters
or a writ of covenant. One yearbook note stipulates that warranty of charters is
brought for a gift ("doun"), whereas covenant is brought for a render ("rendre").
The original writ determined the binding quality of the fine. A final concord based on
a writ of warranty of charters could be defeated in two ways: by denying that the deed
on which the action was based was followed by seisin or by showing that the deed
was different from the fine. Such a final concord only bound those privy to it. A final
concord based on a writ of covenant, however, could be denied only by showing that
the court had been deceived; moreover, it bound both those privy and also strangers.
British Library Add. MS. 31826 fol. 226.
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king's court, however, would usually be litigious; the court would
have had trouble relating the possession of specialty to the form of
the writ once the forty shilling rule in debt/detinue had destroyed
the original meaning of the same phrase in those more common
justicies writs. 12 It would seem completely plausible that the regular
appearance of plaintiffs with specialty in covenant before royal justices should influence the way in which those justices thought about
covenant. The question ought not relate to plausibility, but to
whether that was the decisive influence. At any rate, Ibbetson's
rejection of the thesis was not based on the merits, but on a superficial and incorrect reading.
The validity of lbbetson's alternative, however, does not rest
on the accuracy of his criticisms of other approaches. He suggests a
three-stage development for the specialty rule in covenant. The first
stage was the application of the rule to actions brought on leases,
and this application was a borrowing from Roman law. The second
stage was the expansive application of the rule to actions of covenant brought for non-performance of agreements. The third stage
was the application of the rule to covenant in all situations. His
alternative is severely flawed at every point.
Ibbetson bases his first stage solely on the tract Exceptiones
contra brevia, and especially with three of the exceptions that could
be taken to a writ of covenant, which he dates at around 1280. 13 Each
must be treated separately. He renders one of those exceptions "If a
writing has been produced in an action of covenant, he cannot claim
that he is not required to answer this writ or count. '' 14 He infers that
thus specialty was not always necessary, since the exception supposes a limited class of covenant actions in which specialty is produced, not all actions. 15 However, his paraphrase of this exception
is inaccurate. The exception is rendered accurately "Likewise, if
anyone has view of the writing of the covenant, he cannot object
that he is not held to answer such a writ or count." 16 No inference
about the specialty rule can be made from this exception. The point
is completely procedural. Once the defendant has asked for and
received view of the specialty (without indicating whether specialty
will always be present or not), he cannot resort to pleading that he is
12. Palmer, supra note I, at 258-61.
13. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 81-82.
14. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 82.
15. Id.
16. Ibbetson includes the Latin version: ''Item si quis habet visum scripti de
convencione non potest dedicere ei quod non tenetur respondere tali brevi vel
narracioni." !d. at 82 n. 61. An alternative version derives from British Library Add.
MS. 18600, fT. 177-177fv; it is not significantly different: "Item cum quis habuit visum
scripti in brevi de convencione. non pot est dedicere quin teneatur respondere tali
brevi vel narracioni."
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not held to answer: rather, he must challenge a variance between the
writ and count and the specialty or else answer specifically to the
specialty. That order of pleading is observable in several casesY
The next exception lbbetson renders "He can ask what he has
of the covenant, and if he has nothing he can ask for judgment.'' 18
The rendition is accurate, and he quite rightly notes that this is the
same kind of exception used in debt which did not preclude claims
supported only by suit. We both conclude that that exception is not
sufficiently specific to indicate anything about whether or not there
was a specialty rule.
An exception not treated by lbbetson here becomes relevant.
The exception is "Likewise, he can ask judgment inasmuch as he
alleges a special deed or contract and has only the countryside.'' 19 It
could mean that when one alleges a special deed, or contract, indeed, any simple transaction, one cannot simply aver by jury but
must have either the specialty or suit, respectively. This exception
would then indicate that not all covenants were enforceable only if
there was specialty. Special, however, could be read distributively,
as referring to special deeds or special contracts, so that the exception relates to special provisions beyond the basic agreement. 20 This
exception would not be relevant to the general specialty rule in
covenant, but it might well indicate a more limited rule. 21 It is puz17. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 139 (Neumarch v. Thornton: exception as
to whether plaintiff should be answerable by such a writ, after which view of the deed
was asked); British Library Add MS. 37657 fol. 30 (Keyser v. Crescy: defendant first
challenged the count, then waived that exception and alleged variance between writ
and specialty); British Library Add. MS. 31826fv. 345 (John v. Rokele: challenge as
to whether plaintiff should be answered with such writ and count, followed thereafter
by asking what he had of the covenant); Y.B. Pas. 21 Edw. I, 2, Year Books of the
Reign of King Edward /, 23 (Rolls Series, A.J. Horwood ed., 1863-79) (A v. B:
defendant forced to answer to the deed after view instead of challenging the writ,
although complicated by the issue that distraint was possible).
18. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 82 (Ad breve de convencione potest dicere quid
habet de convencione et si nichil habet pet ere judicium." The version in British
Library Add. MS. 18600, f. 177f-fv is not significantly different.)
19. British Library Add. MS. 18600, f. 177-177v.: Item potest petijudicium ex quo
aile gat speciale factum vel contractum et nichil habet nisi patriam.'' The versions in
British Library Harley 1208, f. 132v.; British Library Harley 1120, fv. 152; and British
Library Lansdowne 467, fv. 176 have only minor differences. A different manuscript
merges this exception with the previous one: "Potest dici quid habet de convencione
et si nichil habeat potest petere judicium desicut a/legat speciale factum vel
contractum et nichil habet nisi patriam." British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 303.
That manuscript thus lists only five instead of the standard six exceptions for
covenant.
20. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
21. I think the idea that such a rule was simply applied more broadly, without
further explanation, is inadequate. The difference between the fact of the agreement
and further clauses added on to it is an important one, given the origins ofthe writ of
covenant that I am explicating in another article. It would require a substantial
change in approach. The existence of this limited rule, however, would have made it
more easy for the influence of the justicies writ that I argue to operate.
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zling that lbbetson chose not to treat this exception, despite its
obvious relevance.
The third exception lbbetson treats refers to leases and is central to his thesis: "He can ask for judgment if he counts for a certain
term and this certain term is not put in writing. " 22 Several meanings
are possible; he has chosen the least likely. He reads terminus
(term) to mean lease, not a specific word of the agreement or the
length of the lease. Accepting that for the moment, certus terminus
non ponitur in scripto could mean, as he says, that the lease was not
written down at all and thus was not enforceable. 23 It could also
mean that the particular term or duration of the lease, the certain
term was not put in the writing: that the specialty proffered talked
about a lease without mentioning the duration of the lease, whereas
his count specified a certain term. A third meaning, which overlaps
with the second, is that certus terminus actually does mean specific
word. 24 There would thus be a difference between a specific part of
the contract alleged and the wording of the specialty. Finally, it
could mean that there is a difference between the existence of a
lease and specific details of a lease; specific details had to be in
writing. 25 Of these, lbbetson's choice is the least likely, because it
does not explain why the exception talks about certus terminus
instead of merely terminus. lbbetson's sole adduced proof for the
existence of a specialty rule in covenant limited to leases around
1280 indicates nothing of the kind.
His derivation of the rule from Roman law is also flawed. I have
no pretensions to knowledge of Roman law, but his choice of the
Roman emphyteusis over the locatio rei, on his own description, as
the appropriate analogy for the English leasehold seems particularly
inappropriate. The emphyteusis was "the holding of land on a hereditary basis either for a fixed term or in perpetuity in exchange for
22. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 82.
23. /d.

24. lbbetson dismisses this possibility by saying that the exception would no
longer make sense, "especially as the courts might be willing to allow the pleading of
parol terms in actions brought on written agreements." lbbetson, supra note 5, at 82
n. 63. The two cases he cites are irrelevant. One is an assize of mort dancestor, in
which deeds were treated very differently from in other actions. The other is an
action of debt for money given by reason of a marriage; such agreements always
caused unusual problems. Palmer, Contexts of Marriage in Medieval England: Evidence from the King's Court circa 1300, 59 Speculum 42 (1984).
An exception analogous to the one envisaged here is an action of debt that arose
from a broken covenant. The exception was that the deed did· not specify a certain
day for the performance. Mohaut v. Boys, British Library Add. MS. 35116 fol. 240.
25. lbbetson notes that actions of covenant of lessee against lessor to regain the
term after lessee was ousted by lessor did not seem to require specialty. lbbetson,
supra note 5, at 92. This would be a case in which the mere fact of the lease was at
issue, as distinct from specific terms.
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the payment of rent. " 26 The English leasehold, unlike the emphyteusis, was not hereditary: it was a chattel that went to executors. The
seemingly proprietary aspects of leasehold in the treatises lbbetson
cites are always carefully circumscribed. If there is an English analogy to the emphyteusis, it would seem to be the fee farm, as
lbbetson's citations might well indicate. 27 That analogy is often
made. 28 The appropriate analogue to the normal English lease would
be the locatio rei, the bailing or letting of a thing in return for
compensation. The analogy on whiCh his argument rests is faulty.
Moreover, even if the civil law emphyteusis influenced the English
lease despite the lack of a close analogy, it leaves as an anomaly one
of Ibbetson's findings: that a lessee's suit in covenant against his
lessor to recover after the lessor ejected him seems not to have
required the lessee to support his suit with specialty. 29 There is
literally nothing that remains of lbbetson' s first stage ofthe deyelopment of the specialty rule in covenant.
The second stage (the first extension of the rule) requires similarly close attention. lbbetson adduces three reports to indicate the
specialty rule between 1292 and 1304. There is no apparent extension beyond what can be perceived in the Exceptiones contra
brevia.
Corbett v. Mercury 30 is a well-known case from the eyre of
Shropshire of 1292. It has been assumed that its two reports, one
indicating a plaint of debt and the other a plaint of covenant, were
widely divergent reports of the same case. 31 It seems, rather, that
there were two different cases between the same parties and based
· on the same factual situation: a plaint of debt reported twice 32 and a
plaint of covenant reported once. 33 The plaint of debt went to the
jury. The report of the plaint of covenant ended on an exception that
the plaintiff ought not be answered unless he could produce a writing. The report itself does not indicate that this exception was successful, except that it terminated at that point. It is unlikely that both
26. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 83.
27. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 83 n. 67.
28. Black's Law Dictionary 554 (5th ed. 1979).
29. lbbetson, supra note 5, at 92.
30. I Y.B. 20 Edw. I, supra note 17, at 222, 487.
31. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 87-88 (here only following the normal treatment of
the case).
32. I Y.B. 20 Edw. I, supra note 17 at 222, 487. The former reference is on the
same page as the plaint of covenant and is described as based on a writ of debt. The
exception taken, however, concerns the lack of a writ: it is certainly a plaint of debt.
Moreover, both reports of the debt plaint concern 20 shillings, retail the same inappropriate 40 shilling limitation exception, and have the same pleaders in the same
relationship.
33. /d. at i, 223.
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suits were allowed to continue, and it is at least possible that the
plaintiff realized that his suit was weak without specialty. He appeared against another defendant claiming an obligatory writing;
that suit failed. 34 He could have been suing to recover a deed that
had been put into the hands of a trusted third party. The failure of
that plea would reinforce the possibility that the exception as to lack
of specialty was successful. If so, however, the exception can only
be construed as that found in Exceptiones contra brevia: that if
certain terms, and not the mere existence of an agreement, are alleged, they have to be put in writing. The issue in this case did
involve a special agreement in addition to the lease of a horse.
The second case concerned a lease for 10 years with the stipulation of free ingress and egress. The report mirrors the alternative
version of one of the covenant exceptions in Exceptiones contra
brevia: "Likewise, one can ask judgment inasmuch as he alleges a
special deed or contract and has only the countryside. " 35 In this
case the defendant, asked what he had to show, responded that he
was ready to verify per sectam patrie (by suit of the countryside). 36
The inclusion of sectam was probably a mistake; the context supports the interpretation that he wanted merely to rely on a jury
verdict, as the tract would suppose. The defendant then, in accord
with the tract, asked judgement if "without a special deed attesting
the abovesaid covenant he ought to be answered. " 37 The exception
was successful. The need for the special deed probably relates to the
ingress and egress stipulation. The close following of Exceptiones
contra brevium would not indicate any broadening.
The third case is perplexing, but shows no alteration in the rules
pertinent to covenant. The lessor had leased to the lessee for two
years; lessee was supposed to have made a writing that he would not
hold over. Lessee did not make the writing, but did hold over for a
further eight years. Defendant first argued that, since the writing
was not made, the covenant was not made. This line of thought
presupposes that two covenants were involved: the lease itself and a
different covenant not to hold over. Lessor's response confirmed
this conceptualization, isolating the holding over as the cause of the
34. /d. at i, 284.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
36. British Library Add. MS. 5925 fol. 162 (Mich. 31 Edw. I)("Et unde idem Adam
[de P. capellanus] dicit quod cum predictus W. [Pistor] dimisit ei predictum
tenementum usque ad finem x. annorum etc. cum Iibera ingressu et egressu ad
eundem. [W. Pistor:] si quid habeat de convencione. Et A dicit quod per sectam
patrie paratus est predictam convencionem verificare. Et predictus W. petit judicium
asque facto speciali predictam conventionem atestante responderi debeat per quod
factum predictum W. sibi faceret responsalem in hac parte. Consideratur quod
predictus W. inde sine die.")
37. /d.
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action. Indeed, such a covenant against holding over could be distinguished from ingress and egress clauses, dates of performance, or
the number of years involved in the lease, because it took effect only
after the term expired and was thus not strictly appurtenant to the
lease. Lessee's initial response failed, whereupon lessor was asked
to show what he had of the covenant, whereupon he offered to aver
by a jury. Lessee responded with an exception that sounds directly
on point: "Covenant falls naturally in specialty, and of this you
show nothing; judgment. " 38 The exception was unsuccessful. I take
the exception at something less than face value, as a variant on the
exception to a special deed or contract supported only by the tender
of a jury. It did not work here, apparently, because the hold over
covenant was a separate covenant from the lease. It turned out that
lessee claimed a free tenement adjudged him by an assize of novel
disseisin. For the second stage, then, nothing that Ibbetson adduces
shows any need for specialty in covenant as such, except when
special clauses were alleged. 39
Ibbetson's concluding section details those areas in which covenant at the end of the reign of Edward I continued to be brought
without specialty. He groups them in the category of "covenant for
wrongs. " 4° For him the most prominent area involves lessees who
commit waste, but this category also includes what might be considered the main area for covenant: remedy for the lessee against a
lessor who deprived him of the lease during the term. By the 1330s,
however, all covenant cases in the king's court required specialty. 41
Since the only specialty rule thus far observed prior to 1320 relates
to special clauses, this once again centers attention on what happened in the Waltham Carrier Case. 42 Ibbetson forwards scholarship by bringing these cases into discussion, but he fails both to
recognize the rule about special clauses and to explain the origins of
the specialty rule in covenant generally.

38. 5 Y.B. Pasc. 32 Edw. I, supra note 17 at 200-201.
39. Those who like to see Roman law importations will refer to lbbetson's footnote
64, to find that John Bassianus had a similar idea. The similarity should not be
automatically taken to prove a borrowing. In passing it should be noted that
Ibbetsons's perception of a shift from the substance ofthe agreement to the fact of the
agreement as perceived in venue rules is faulty, being anchored in a case concerning
Scottish lands and having strong parallels in other personal actions.
40. Ibbetson does not show how he distinguishes between committing waste on the
one hand and damaging a horse or holding over on the other. It would seem that all
could be considered "covenant for wrongs."
41. Ibbetson, supra note 5, at 93.
42. The Eyre of London, /4 Edward II, A.D. /32/, Part ii, 86 Selden Soc. 286
(Helen M. Cam, ed., 1969).
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II. The Biancalana Thesis on Justicies Writs
Biancalana tried to dismantle the justicies writ thesis as thoroughly as I have tried to do this to Ibbetson's thesis on covenant. I
argued that most of the justicies writs (most prominently, viscontiel
writs of debt/ detinue and covenant) presupposed a plaintiff that had
a showing of a higher nature than suit, normally specialty. Those
writs were provided to relegate routine cases to the county courts,
and for that purpose the writs provided plaintiffs with the advantageous force given specialty in the king's court, but now to be applied
in county courts when the suit was brought by writ. "Palmer," he
says, "is almost certainly wrong in his argument about the justicies
writ of debt.' ' 43 He much prefers to read the evidence as showing the
justicies writs as a mechanism that "extended royal control over
county courts and facilitated the collection of royal revenue. " 44
Biancalana's suggestion shows the remarkable vitality of Maitland's approach to twelfth and thirteenth century English legal history. That tradition views the maxim "no man need answer for his
free tenement without a royal writ" precisely as a mechanism for
licensing and thus controlling pleas of land in feudal courts and as a
source of revenue. That approach to Angevin legal development has
proven bankrupt. 45 From a completely a priori perspective then,
Biancalana's approach would seem improbable, as based on a faulty
perception of Angevin legal change. Having put Biancalana in an
historiographical context, however, does not show that he is wrong;
it only shows that evaluating his analysis is important for determining the overall nature of the origins of English common law.
On a crucially important point Biancalana and I worked on
different assumptions, assumptions that seemed so obvious as not to
need proof and really not to need explication. I worked on the assumption that county courts had jurisdiction in debt/detinue and
covenant by plaint, so that the introduction of justicies writs after
around 1200 was in addition to that continuing jurisdiction by plaint.
Litigants thus had a choice as to whether or not to buy a writ until
the 1290s, at which time writs became available that prohibited debt/
detinue plaints for forty shillings or more in the lower courts.
Biancalana started from the opposite assumption: that the plaint
jurisdiction in debt/ detinue and covenant in county courts ended
with the provision of the justicies writs. Litigants thus would have
43. Biancalana, Book Review, supra note 3, at 315.
44. /d.
45. S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (1976); Palmer,
The Economic and Cultural Impact of the Origins of Property, 3 Law & Hist. Rev.
375 (1985); Palmer, The Feudal Framework of English Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1130
(1981); Palmer, The Origins of Property in England, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. I (1985).

1987

COVENANT, JUSTICIES WRITS, AND REASONABLE SHOWINGS

107

had no choice at all. It was from this perspective that he read the
book, and only toward the end of his discussion of the justicies writ
of debt does he consider my working assumption: "Palmer's argument would be more convincing if we knew that a plaintiff in, for
example, a case of debt was required to begin his suit with ajusticies
writ. For if he were not so required, he could begin by plaint and
thereby avoid the requirement of a charter.' ' 46 My assumption can at
least be established as probable, and Biancalana's caveats and suggestions as mistaken.
Little doubt can exist that litigants did not need to purchase a
justicies writ to bring cases in county courts throughout most of the
thirteenth century. The best quantitative evidence we have would
indicate that in 1330, only 10% of the cases in county court were
brought by writY Working backwards, the requirement of a writ in
county court for debt/detinue cases claiming forty shillings or more
originated in the 1290s. Biancalana thought that the date was uncertain48 and cited John Beckerman's article, without reference to the
additional information contained in County Courts. 49 It is difficult to
see how the date can be uncertain when the first writ of prohibition
of forty shilling plaints in debt/detinue was issued in 1295 50 , lower
court plaint cases in debt/detinue for thirty-nine shillings 11 pence
(the typical way to avoid the forty shilling requirement) appeared
only in 1292 51 , and the first formulation of a rule (although a rule not
yet enforceable by prohibition or, as far as I can find, by false
judgment) was in 1286. 52 Moreover, I documented plaints of debt/
detinue in county courts from early in the reign of Edward I, none of
which were challenged on jurisdictional grounds. 53 The use of the
writ recordari for the removal of such plaints in 1275 would have
sufficiently indicated the existence of such plaints. 54 There is no
basis at all for thinking that county jurisdiction over plaints in debt/
detinue was limited prior to the 1280s; there is much documentation
showing that the rule arose and became enforceable in the years
1281 to 1295. Biancalana completely compartmentalized my treatment of the forty shilling rule when he wrote on the justicies writs,
46. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1012.
47. Palmer, supra note I, at 226.
48. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1012.
49. J. Beckerman, The Forty-Shilling Jurisdictional Limit in Medieval English
Personal Actions, in Leg. Hi st. Stud. 1972 110 (D. Jenkins ed. 1975).
50. Palmer, supra note I, at 257.
51. ld. at 254.
52. ld. at 255.
53. /d. at 253.
54. Jd. at 250.
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and did not go back to revise those views when he later analyzed my
treatment of the rule. 55
One can confidently assert that significant plaints in debt/
detinue appeared in. county courts in the 1270s; we can be equally
confident about the earlier thirteenth century. Prior to the justicies
writs, in the twelfth century, there was debt litigation in the county
courts. 56 The provision of the justicies writs did not result in the
massive issuance of such writs, as would have occurred had the
writs been required for all debt litigation. 57 Moreover, if there was
some point early in the thirteenth century whenjusticies writs were
made mandatory for all debt/detinue litigation in county courts, that
decision has left no trace. Finally, that decision would have had to
have been reversed at some point prior to the reign of Edward I to
account for the jurisdiction documentable at that time; the undocumented reversal of an undocumented royal position in such an important matter is extremely implausible. Any assertion that justicies
writs were forced on all county litigants in debt/detinue in the early
thirteenth century must be met with extreme scepticism. Biancalana's assumption about the requirement for the justicies and the
consequent proposed motivation for licensing and control must
therefore be dismissed; all of the documentation and almost all of
the argument necessary for this dismissal appear in the book he was
reviewing.
This mistaken assumption undermines the rest of Biancalana's
analysis of the justicies writ of debt. He thought it improbable in the
early thirteenth century, under men such as Hubert Walter, to allow
enforcement of debts only if they were evidenced with specialty and
that such a requirement was more reasonable late in the thirteenth
century when literacy was higher. 58 However, such a requirement
was improbable anytime in medieval England. The justicies writs
did not force people to change their practices, because there was no
necessity to purchase the writ to enforce the debt. Prior to the 1280s
they could always resort to the plaint jurisdiction of the counties;
thereafter, they could get a justicies writ even if they did not have
specialty. Litigants without specialty always had some option.
The financial motivation Biancalana adduces is groundless. He
thought that the writ ''facilitated collection of the third part of a debt
owed to the king when a debt was collected with the king's process. " 59 There was no facilitation: the third part was only due if the
55. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, a 1014-15.
56. Palmer, supra note I, at 184.
57. /d. at 186-87.
58. Biancalana, Book Review, supra note 3, at 315; Biancalana, Medieval County
Courts, supra note 4, at 1009-10.
59. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1008.
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debt enforcement began with a royal writ. Biancalana thought that
the Rotuli de Oblatis highlighted the financial importance of the
writs. 60 On the contrary, they merely noted the few payments promised. Whether these payments are viewed as motive or welcome
result depends on the reader's judgment. Those who imagine that
the writs were provided merely as a very clever gimmick to increase
revenue underestimate Angevin government and fail to put the
records in proper perspective.
The question comes into better perspective when one realizes
that litigants did not have to purchase the writs. The pressing question then becomes why they were willing to surrender a third (or a
half, quarter, sixth or tenth) of the debt to the king to have a writ.
Litigants would not part with their money simply to gain the experience of going into Chancery or to impress the sheriff with their
diligence; there had to be some benefit that made the origination of
the suit by writ particularly desirable. Isolating that reason was the
purpose behind sorting through the possibilities that the justicies
writs were manu-militari collection devices or constituted the sheriff as ajustice. 61 Biancalana viewed that exercise as wrong-headed, 62
but both those theories, had they been possible, would have provided the motivation for litigants to purchase the writs. Once those
were excluded, it remained possible that the writs provided jury
procedure, a desirable matter for plaintiffs as compared to defendant's compurgation; but that seems to have ,been a matter that grew
up later in the century. 63 Finally, the possibility of removal to the
king's court could have been a motivation for litigants, except that
that motivation is not believable until later in the century. 64
It is the exclusion of all other possible motivations for the writs,
including Biancalana's suggestion of control and revenue, that raises
the possibility that the justicies writs were provided to keep certain
kinds of cases from clogging the king's court by making the writ
demand the better procedure of the king's court for the individual
case in county court. If the procedure was not trial by jury, nor
access to removal by pone, nor the constitution of a friendly sheriff
as justice, nor mere executive collection of the debt the remaining
possibilities are not numerous. Those possibilities excluded, and
obscurantism being undesirable, it remains to find that possibility
that the evidence does tend to support. That the form of the writ was
related to its effect and motivation is not improbable. The word
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

/d. at 1009.
Palmer, supra note I, at 187-98.
Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1006-08.
Palmer, supra note I, at 215-16.
/d. at 217-18.
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justicies having been eliminated as the decisive element, there only
remain the words 'as he shall reasonably have been able to show':
sicut rationabiliter monstrare poterit.
Biancalana raises several objections to my construction of the
reasonable showing clause; none are well conceived. Biancalana
notes, as did !, 65 that there were two justicies writs in Glanvi/1, 66
although he does not note that the book already handles his objections. Start with the facias writ for enforcing testamentary bequests.
Biancalana objects that such writs would not demand the plaintiff to
have written proof, because a donor's death-bed gift did not have to
be written. 67 That criticism assumes that the writ would apply to all
potential litigants under a bequest; that it was a general remedy for
testamentary bequests. The commentary in Glanvill indicates that it
was not appropriate when the will was not rightly made (testamentum non fuerit recte factum) or when it was disputed whether the
thing claimed was thus devised. 68 The writ was thus appropriate
only for the very clear cases, as when, one might suppose, the
testamentum was written; otherwise it went to the ecclesiastical
courts. 69 Nevertheless, this was a facias, not a justicies writ and
looked to more executive action, as simply to make the division of
the chattels in a judicial setting. Then, as to the writ for delivering
chattels after an assize of novel disseisin, contrary to Biancalana, 70
Glanvill does not indicate that it is a writ of execution. Only after the
sheriff has failed to obey the writ of execution would the plaintiff
purchase the writ for restoring chattels; 71 the fact that the sheriff had
declined to restore the chattels indicates that there remained further
problems. However, when the plaintiff in the justicies writ arrived
in county court, he could well have been expected to have evidence
of the court record of the assize of novel disseisin or at least of the
writ of execution on which his justicies writ was based. Neither of
these writs provides any basis for doubt about the thesis; only the
writ of customs and services is a problem.
Biancalana considers that Glanvill's commentary on the writ of
customs and services decisively undercuts my thesis, because of the
reference to the suit proceeding by the custom of the county. The
problem is serious, but analysis of Glanvill offers only two alternatives. The first is that the reasonable showing phrase only refers to
65. /d. at 182, 210-11.
66. Bianca1ana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1010-11.
67. ld. at 1011.
68. vii Tractatus de /egibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie qui Glanvilla vacatur,
8 (81) (Hall ed. 1965) (hereinafter Glanvill).
69. ld.
70. Biancalana, Medievel County Courts, supra note 4, at 1010.
71. Glanvill, supra note 68, at 170.
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local custom. This was Biancalana's conclusion even though I had
handled that possibility in the book. Chancery, however, could be
very precise in referring to local custom as the relevant law. 72 Moreover, if the writ was not conferring special procedure but only mandating the application of local custom, there was no reason for plaintiffs to surrender so large a portion of their claim to purchase the
writ. The other alternative in approaching Glanvill is to examine
other possibilities of what he meant. In the book I mentioned four
possibilities, the most likely of which is that handling the case according to the custom of the county would apply to all matters
except the preclusive power of the deed: the form of the count, the
mesne process, the accustomed nature of the court and its judges,
and the method of execution after judgment. 73 None of these writs
presents any serious problems for the thesis; the writs concerning
testamentary divisions and restoration of chattels after an assize of
novel disseisin certainly support it.
Biancalana takes me to task for overlooking the possibility that
the early justicies writs involving the archae cyrographorum were a
possible influence on the origins of the viscontiel justicies writs. 74
The archae was a collection of the written bonds that proved debts
owed to Jews. That origin would help establish the relationship of
the viscontiel justicies writs to specialty. I would agree, but I did not
overlook the possibility. I examined the earliest justicies writs in the
pipe rolls and concluded that they were special procedures for Jewish plaintiffs in debt, not viscontiel debt writs. 75 Most of those were
prior to the creation of the archae in 1194, but the presumption is
72. Palmer, supra note I, at 210.
73. Palmer, supra note I, at 210, n. 87.
74. Biancalana also asserts that I did not pay much attention to the greed and
oppression of sheriffs or the reason for the decline of the county courts. Biancalana,
Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 995, 1002-03. In this he followed the lead,
seemingly, of Stephen White, who commented "Palmer therefore concludes that
while the viscontiel bureaucracy was hardly 'a faultless servant of the public interest,' it was probably not 'as corrupt as the occasional virulent protest might indicates'
(p. 55). One need not share Palmer's sunny view of medieval county bureaucracy .... "White, The Medieval English County Court (Book Review), 81 Mich. L.
Rev. 963, %5 (1983). Unlike Helen Cam, Stephen White, and Biancalana, I do not
believe that every allegation of misconduct is true; had the Hundred Rolls resulted in
indictments, it must be expected that the majority of those accused, like the majority
of those indicted for homicide, would legitimately have been acquitted. Few allegations of misconduct appear in the plea rolls; for many of them, the sheriffs action was
colorable. On the other hand, Stephen White did not mention, nor does Biancalana
seem to see, that the heavily argued chapter on removal is based completely on the
problems with sheriffs and bailiffs; the only way around those problems was limiting
de facto county jurisdiction, causing the decline of the importance of the county court
in the fourteenth century. I treated almost all the things Biancalana believes I
ignored.
75. Palmer, supra note I, at 184-85.
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that this was a precursor. I explicitly related the Jewish chyrographs
to the viscontiel justicies writs and specialty at the end of the treatment of the reasonable showing clause. 76
Nothing that Biancalana has to say on the subject of the
justicies writ of debt holds up. His analysis is undercut by the assumption that all county plaintiffs in debt were forced to buy
justicies writs. That allowed him to hypothesize control and revenue
motives, instead of inquiring about the reason why litigants would
pay to have an optional writ. Moreover, he compartmentalized certain portions of the text out of the discussion, particularly that having to do with the forty shilling rule, and did not examine Glanvill
with sufficient care. The thesis on the justicies writs is not proven; a
more explanatory thesis may surface. Until then, it must seem that
the justicies writs were provided to keep debt/detinue and covenant
suits out of the king's court, particularly when they involved few
legal problems: the perception of the suit when plaintiff had
specialty. 77
III. Biancalana's Approach to the Covenant Rule
Unpersuaded by the justicies debt material, Biancalana was
understandably sceptical about my thesis on the origins of the specialty rule in covenant: both relied heavily on the construction of the
reasonable showing clause in the justicies writs. He preferred to
hypothesize that the specialty rule in covenant simply grew up in
both county and king's court during the thirteenth century.
On one point Biancalana is undeniably correct. The strongest
direct evidence I adduced for mid-century practice relating justicies
covenant directly to specialty came from the comparison between
two cases in the Berkshire eyre of 1248. He points out, correctly,
that I over-construed the justicies case. 78 The loss of that piece of
evidence, however, does not defeat the thesis; it merely removes
one piece of confirmatory evidence. What remains from the original
data is what I consider a strong argument from the origins of the
justicies writs as a class at the beginning of the thirteenth century,
and a very strong argument about the reasonable showing clause late
the thirteenth century. Evidence in between was desirable, but not
necessary, since what was argued was continuity and what the plea
rolls provide is a very uninformative record on the necessary points.
Biancalana's approach to the covenant material must change, if
he acknowledges the thesis in regard to justicies debt; the idea
that the custom of a specialty requirement simply grew up along
76. /d. at 211.
77. Palmer, supra note I, at 214-15.
78. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1013.
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with growing literacy seems positively obscurantist. Moreover,
Biancalana's hypothesis does not fit well with the analysis of
Ibbetson's thesis.
IV. Reasonable Showing
At the time I wrote the book, I had four cases from the 1290s
which used the words reasonable showing, all in reference to specialty. Two of these cases had originally been brought in county
court by justicies writs of debt. The third had been brought in the
court of King's Lynn. The fourth was a case probably but not surely
removed from a lower court by pone. 79 All of the cases were in debt,
whereas it would have been desirable to have evidence that the
reasonable showing clause was similarly construed in covenant. The
evidence nevertheless was strong enough to demonstrate the meaning attached to the clause in the 1290s. Further evidence is now
available that goes beyond what I had then.
The evidence of the association between the reasonable showing clause in debt litigation and specialty is now overwhelming.
Prior of Barnwell v. B. was a claim of ten marks in which the
defendant referred to the plaintiff's proffered writing as reasonable
de monstrance. 80 Prioress of Westwood v. Prior to Malverne Parva
is a case of debt for· twenty pounds in which the defendant twice
referred to the proffered writing as renable demunstraunce. 81 De Ia
Chape v. Anon. was a claim for fourteen marks in which the defendant challenged a variance between count and the plaintiff's
proferred writing, his resonable demonstrance. 82 Fitz Richard v.
Richard, 83 Anon v. Anon, 84 A v. Executors of D, 85 R de P v. W. de
M, 86 Executors of Steven de Bedeford v. Giffard, 87 and Lay v. Skelton88 are further examples in which plaintiffs' proffered writings in
actions of debt are termed resonable demonstraunce. None of these
cases mention removal, so that it cannot be shown that they were
actually brought originally by justicies writs and removed. Nevertheless, the frequency with which justicies writs were removed from
79. Palmer, supra note I, at 200-202.
80. British Library Add. MS. 35116 fol. 240.
81. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 379 (1305?).
82. British Library Add. MS. 35116 fv. 235.
83. Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 188 fol. 17.
84. Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 188 fv. 17.
85. Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 188 fol. 18; Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. Misc. 87 fv. 31;
British Library Add. 31826 fv. 67.
86. Harvard MS. 162 fv. 197.
87. British Library Add. MS. 37657 fv. 67.
88. British Library Add. MS. 37657 fv. 122.
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county courts in the 1290s together with the term itself make it
probable that they were brought by justicies and removed by pone.
There are now thirteen known cases of debt in which the term is
used; each time it refers to specialty.
In the book I was unable to adduce any proof that this usage
extended beyond cases of debt; the assertion rested on the meaning
of the common form of the justicies writs. Neumarch v. Thornton,
however, is a case of covenant brought on a lease agreement that
stipulated further that the lessee would return the manor in as good a
condition as he found it, whereupon the lessee abated the house and
trees. The plaintiff proffered specialty, appropriately since he was
stipulating a special agreement beyond the mere lease. The defendant then challenged a variance between the writ and count on the
one hand and the renable demonstraunce on the other. 89 Keyser v.
Crescy is another covenant case. Lessor had leased to lessee twothirds of a manor, reserving the remaining third as dower for the
widow, including a commitment to warrant the lessee against all
men. The lessor then allowed the widow to recover her dower from
the lessee and would not warrant him, contrary to the covenant. The
lessee in court challenged a variance between the writ and the
resnable demonstraunce. 90 The phrase referred to the writing, because the defendant immediately clarified his challenge by reference
to le bref and then to le Jet. 91 The meaning of reasonable showing as
related to specialty in the 1290s cannot be contested, whether for
debt or covenant.
One further indication of the relationship between reasonable
showing and specialty comes from a yearbook note.
Why will one not have detinet in a viscontiel writ of debt after
the debet, as one has in a writ pleadable in Bench? The damages supposed derive from the detinet and are as well recovered
by the one writ as by the other. According to some, it is because
of the rationabiliter monstrare etc. which follows the debet and
clarifies it. By others, it is because as soon as a man obliges
himself by a writing he owes the debt, but he does not detain
until the day passes. 92

89. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 139.
90. British Library Add. MS. 37657 fol. 30.
91. /d.
92. Pur quey en bref de dette vescantal si navera /em pas detinet apres /e debet
sicam en brefpledable en banke. De pus qe damages qe supposez sunt par le detinet
ausi bien estre recovere par /an bref cum par /autre. Secundum qaosdam, par le
rationabiliter monstrare etc. qe ensyat qe esclarsist le debet etc. Et per qaosdam, a
plus tot qe un home est oblige par escrist si deit ilia dette, mes il ne detent point tant
qe /e ior seit passe. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 236.
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Such yearbook notes are difficult, but one must try to make sense
out of both the answers presented in the text. The first answer is that
the phrase "as he shall reasonably have been able to show" clarifies
the phrase "he owes," so that the specification about damages
could come later. It is possible that this answer envisages the clarification to come in the count, such that the reasonable showing would
refer to making a good count. As an answer, this is unlikely but
understandable, as I will show below. The second answer is better. I
take the meaning to indicate a distinction between justicies debt and
precipe debt, as supposed in the question. In justicies debt everything flows from the writing, and thus only the debet is necessary. ln
precipe debt, since the plaintiff did not need to have a writing, the
detinet serves in place of the deed. A somewhat different understanding of the second answer would suppose thatjusticies debt was
normally initiated close but prior to the date on which the debt was
due, whereas a precipe writ of debt could only be purchased after
the due date. Either explanation of the second answer, however,
indicates that the plaintiff in justicies debt would have a writing.
Just as interesting as the clear specialty requirement envisaged
in the second answer is the implausible nature of the first answer.
The implausibility, presuming that the clarification referred to would
be in the count, is that this explanation would make the reasonable
showing phrase superfluous. Precipe debt as well as justicies debt
demanded a count that would clarify and expand on the writ. That
necessity did not derive from any words in the writ. The answer
would have been understandable, however, because counts began
Ceo vous moustre. The first answer would nevertheless have received some hearing because of the date at which the note was
written. The manuscript in which the note appears could have been
written as late as 1308 or 1309. The reasonable showing clause in
justicies debt writs, however, was rendered meaningless by 1295.
With the writs prohibiting county courts from entertaining debt/
detinue plaints for forty shillings or more, it became necessary for
Chancery to issue justicies writs and for county courts to honor
such writs even when the plaintiff did not have specialty. No longer
was the primary fact in purchasing justicies debt writs whether or
not one had specialty; it was whether the claim was for forty shillings or more. If the claim exceeded forty shillings, one had to have a
writ to plead in county; if it was less, one retained a choice as to
whether to proceed by plaint or by writ.
The debt forty shilling rule superseded the justicies debt specialty rule around 1290. The change was the reason why Biancalana
was able to find in my citations a case brought by justicies in which
the plaintiff did not have specialty: the case was brought in 1298,
after the specialty rule in justicies debt had given way to the forty
shilling rule. Biancalana concluded that the specialty rule was slow
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in developing; 93 I conclude that the specialty rule in debt had already
disappeared. Certain individuals, of course, would continue to refer
to specialty as reasonable showing, but one could expect perplexity
about the writ form in the early fourteenth century.
In the book most of the analysis went to the rationabiliter in
sicut rationabiliter monstrare poterit. I wanted to avoid any possible conclusion that specialty seemed particularly "rational." Equal
attention, however, should be given to monstrare. Litigants never
spoke about "showing" suit, but rather about "producing" suit.
However, one did speak about showing deeds and tallies. 94 And,
indeed, there is a case from 1241 by justicies writ in the county court
of Buckinghamshire in which the plaintiff proved his debt by tally and
suit, that is, by tally proved by the oath of six men. 95 Whether this
was a sealed or unsealed tally is unknown. Since the debt for which
the plaintiff was suing was assigned to him by the king, one can
suspect the more formal sealed tally, which was roughly equivalent
to specialty, 96 and certainly something that could be "shown." As
he shall reasonably have been able to show can on the force of the
terms themselves be seen to indicate that some physical showing
must be made: writing or, perhaps, a sealed tally.
The reasoning proposed in the book for the origins of the specialty rule in covenant in king's court still seems good. The forty
shilling rule in debt/detinue made the crucial phrase in justicies
debt/detinue meaningless. Since those writs were far more common
than covenant, that weakened the relationship in legal thought between the reasonable showing clause and specialty requirements.
However, the forty shilling rule did not affect justicies covenant,
which (by pone) was one if not the most frequent way of bringing
litigious covenant cases into the king's court. Also, plaintiffs in
those suits removed from county would still have had specialty,
accustoming the justices to specialty in covenant. The juxtaposition
of cases removed from county with precipe cases (which would not
have required specialty) would produce the historical record that
makes it look as if the law was ambivalent. Since the relationship
between the writ and specialty became harder to perceive after the
forty shilling rule appeared in debt, it is not surprising that justices
93. Biancalana, Medieval County Courts, supra note 4, at 1012.
94. Typical proffers of specialty are Veez sonfet or mist avant un escrist. A good
example of the less common usage: Hou. Quey avez vous de Ia dette. Spigurnel.
Siwte bone. Hott. Avez vous altre chose pur nous lier a Ia dette? Spigurnel. Nanyl.
Hou. Sire, i1 nous demande une dette de x mars e.;/ ne moustre rien a Ia court pur
nous /ier: escrist ne faille ne altre chose qe fur vaillefor lor vent. Harvard MS. 162 fv.
190. J.H. Baker, Manual of Law French 144 (1979).
95. 16 Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of Henry lll 1700 (L.C. Hector, ed. 1979).
96. British Library Add. MS. 31826 fv. 360.
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began associating covenant with specialty in a more jurisprudential
fashion, identifying it, contrafactually ,97 with evidentiary problems.
As stated in the book, "The specialty rule in covenant was thus
philosophically grounded in evidence, but historically rooted in a
misconception. " 98 Nothing in the lbbetson article or in the
Biancalana reviews has weakened the argument. Hopefully, this
response will clear the way for furthering understanding of legal
change in thirteenth and fourteenth century England.

97. There is no reason why covenant, like debt, could not have allowed for
compurgation when plaintiff had no specialty.
98. Palmer, supra note I, at 209.

